

HEIDEGGER ON MINENESS AND MEMORY

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Abstract. *Recent efforts to analyze notions of subjectivity draw on the notions of auto-noetic consciousness and episodic memory from the literature in psychology and cognitive science, and on theories of time consciousness and subjectivity from phenomenology. In doing so, leading interpreters have relied primarily on Husserl's theories of time consciousness. This paper outlines the significantly different approach grounded in Heidegger's analysis of the temporality and historicity of the self. Heidegger's framework proves to be fruitful for an analysis of auto-noetic consciousness, and challenges several fundamental presumptions of dominant psychological models of episodic memory.*

Keywords: Heidegger, *Being and Time*, Historicity, Episodic Memory, Auto-noetic Consciousness, Personal Identity

1. Introduction

Much of Division 2 of *Being and Time* is organized around a recurring question about the connectedness of Dasein. SZ, p. 233, 317, 372f, 387 all repeat the question whether the existential analytic manages to explain the whole of existence, from “birth” to “death.”

How can we be sure that the existential analytic has focused on the *whole* Dasein – this entity from its “beginning” to its “end”? (SZ, p. 233).

The “I” seems to “hold together” the wholeness of the structural whole (SZ, p. 317).

We have not paid attention to the being towards the beginning, and above all the *extendedness* of Dasein *between* birth and death. In particular, we overlooked the “connectedness of life,” in which Dasein constantly somehow holds itself (SZ, p. 373).

It remains a riddle, how this happening as fate is supposed to constitute the whole “connectedness” of Dasein from birth to death (SZ, p. 387).¹

Part of the question is about what “holds Dasein together” and the answer to this lies in Heidegger’s existential notion of the self, as a unity implicit in the care-structure. With this *existential* notion, i.e. with an account of the self as disposed ability, Heidegger argues against interpretations of life, according to which human life is a “sum total of momentary realities of successively arriving and disappearing experiences” (SZ, p. 374) and the self is something that unifies this totality of “time-slices.” This general criticism covers a range of views of the self: Kant’s transcendental apperception, Locke’s psychological continuity, and several views from Husserl. It can also be used to address more recent analyses of the self that emphasize the role of episodic memory in constituting the self by connecting together diachronically distinct experiences.² In particular, it puts Heidegger fundamentally at odds with the groundbreaking views on the self and subjectivity developed by Shawn Gallagher and Dan Zahavi, who draw on the resources of both phenomenology and current cognitive science.³

For Heidegger the question about connectedness is not primarily about consciousness, or even unconscious experiences. This is a fundamental difference between Heidegger and the approach to the persistence of the self over time in Husserl, Gallagher, Zahavi and most of the contemporary literature.⁴ Because Heidegger does not think that consciousness is directly relevant to the continuity or unity of Dasein over time, he almost never mentions *memory* as such. Of course he uses a lot of temporal language and concepts that have to do with memory in some way: *Gegenwärtigen*, *Wiederholen*, *Gewesen*, *Geschichte*, and *Vergessen*. He uses *Erinnerung* twice in the temporality chapter, to point out that temporality is *not* about memory. So, the temporality of anxiety, i.e. the way it brings you back to your thrownness, is *not* a kind of remembering: “This bringing back does not have the character of a forgetful avoiding, nor of remembering” (SZ, p. 343). And in discussing the temporality of

¹ All translations from Heidegger in this paper are my own. Page references throughout are to the German editions of *Sein und Zeit* and the *Gesamtausgabe*.

² For the most parts such views follow in the general footsteps of Locke’s ontology, and there is a big variety of them. An extreme form is the conception of the self as a narrative, which can be found in Ricoeur, MacIntyre, the psychologist Dan McAdams, maybe Dennett, and Velleman. What you are, and what unifies your time-slices, is a narrative that you spin, with the help of your community and culture, over the course of your life. Constructing such a narrative depends on your ability to recollect and reinterpret past episodes of your life.

³ See especially Zahavi, D. *Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective*, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005; and Gallagher, S. and D. Zahavi, *The Phenomenological Mind*, London: Routledge, 2008.

⁴ Consider what Heidegger says about moods in *Fundamental Concepts*: “They reach down into our essence in a more originary way than thinking or acting; in them we first come upon ourselves, as a Da-sein” (GA29/30, p. 102). In analyzing moods “we won’t get anywhere with the distinction between ‘conscious’ and ‘unconscious.’ To awaken a mood cannot simply mean to bring a previously unconscious mood to consciousness. It means to let it awaken, and to let it be as such. However, when we bring a mood to consciousness, know about it and make it the object of knowledge, then we achieve the opposite of waking it. The mood is then destroyed, or at least not reinforced, but made weaker, and changed” (GA29/30, p. 93; cf. SZ, p. 286).

understanding he points out that forgetfulness (*Vergessenheit*), as the inauthentic mode of having-been, “is not merely a lack of remembering... but a positive, ecstatic mode of be-ness.” In an important passage he writes: “Remembering is only possible on the ground of forgetting, and not vice versa. For, in the mode of forgetfulness, be-ness first “discloses” the horizon into which a Dasein that is lost in the “externality” of its dealings can remember” (SZ, p. 339).⁵

Heidegger does not pick out a more fundamental role of memory, because he thinks it is only one way of elaborating the general scheme of human life that he finds ontologically misguided. Heidegger uses the term “connectedness” (*Zusammenhang*) to pick out this general scheme. Memory is one explanation of connectedness, perhaps the preferred explanation. But there are other ways of explaining the persistence of the self through diverse experiences. Kant’s “I think” is one such way, and Husserl’s inner time-consciousness is another. Gallagher and Zahavi also use the broader notion of a connectedness to make sense of memory, using the metaphor of glue: “Our everyday experiences are normally permeated with a kind of temporal super-glue” – by which they mean a Husserlian retention-intention-protection structure – and “memory, with a weaker sort of glue, provides a larger framework for making sense of our experiences” (2008, p. 85).

I want to show how Heidegger’s existential ontology accommodates views on episodic memory and the unity of the self. In other words, I want to outline a Heideggerian approach to the basic phenomena of memory-based conceptions of the self. To do so, I first explain the relevant elements of Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein’s historicity (section 2). Then, I proceed to a phenomenology of the auto-noetic component of episodic memory (section 3). I will end with five Heideggerian theses about episodic memory and auto-noetic consciousness (section 4).

2. Dasein’s Historicity

Heidegger’s basic answer to the connectedness worry comes in chapter 5 of Division 2, the historicity chapter. Here he argues that the conception of the self as connected or unified over time is ontologically obscure, even though it is “justified and sufficient within its limits” (SZ, p. 374). On Heidegger’s view, “connectedness” and diachronic identity derive from his existential notion of extendedness (*Erstreckung*).

Gallagher and Zahavi interpret Heidegger’s notion of extendedness in their section on “historicity” (which is how they translate *Geschichtlichkeit*). They take extendedness to be an “implicit memory” through which “people are influenced by past experience without any explicit awareness that this is the case”. They go on:

Human reality is characterized by a kind of temporal stretch. The past continually serves as the horizon and background of our present experience, and when absorbed in action, our focus, the center of our concern, is not on the present, but on the future goals that we intend or project. The future is salient while the present and the past constitute its background. To be human is already to be situated in the world, born (or thrown – as some phenomenologists say) into it without having chosen to be so, to be

⁵ Note that *prima facie* this passage suggests that only inauthentic Dasein remembers.

present to my surroundings, to be ahead of oneself in future projects (2008, p. 85f).

Gallagher and Zahavi fit historicity, or historicity, into their framework for conceiving of human life as occurring over a succession of experiences. Hence historicity, for them, is a kind of subterranean memory and Dasein's extendedness, or "stretch," consists of the continuing influence of past experiences on present experience and intended future goals. An example of our historicity, according to them, is an impairment of our source memory: I see a headline about *Being and Time* being a work of Nazi propaganda in the *New York Times*, then I forget where I read this, or even that I read this, but I find myself with an aversion to this book.

This reading goes against the grain of Heidegger's basic argument. Note that on this Gallagher/Zahavi view, the extendedness Heidegger talks about in the historicity chapter *derives* from the self's ability to unify diachronic experience by means of memory. Heidegger, however, asserts the opposite of this. Extendedness is supposed to explain how the "connectedness of life," including the unity of diachronically distinct experiences, is possible in the first place.

Dasein does not first fill up a somehow occurrent track or stretch [*Strecke*] "of life" with the phases of its momentary reality, but it extends [*erstreckt*] *itself* in such a way that its own being is already constituted as extendedness [*Erstreckung*] (SZ, p. 374).⁶

This needs to be explained.

To frame his question Heidegger introduces the semi-technical notion of "birth". It is a semi-technical notion because, on the one hand, Heidegger does not use it with its ordinary meaning. He uses it in a sense that reflects his use of "death" as a particular feature of existence (your ownmost, non-relational possibility that never ceases to be relevant); and just like "death," Heidegger wants to take advantage of the ordinary connotations of the word while also maintaining that he is not literally talking about birth. He makes this clear enough by saying, for example:

Understood existentially, birth is never something past in the sense of a no longer occurrent thing, just as death does not have the mode of being of something that has not yet occurred and is impending. Factual Dasein exists as born (*gebürtig*) and as born (*gebürtig*) it also already dies, in the sense of being-towards death (SZ, p. 374).⁷

On the other hand, Heidegger does not provide a detailed phenomenological interpretation of this existential notion of birth. He uses the word a few times in §72 (pp. 373, 374) to worry about the notion of a continuous expanse from birth to death, and then again in §74 (p. 390) when he answers that worry in terms of Dasein's extended constancy. In

⁶ Heidegger's ironic use of *füllt...auf* might indicate that one of his proximal targets here is Husserl.

⁷ In German we say *Ich bin gebürtiger Hamburger* (cf. "German-born" or "natural-born"), which has Heidegger's intended connotation of having been born and (therefore) continuing to be as.

working out this answer, Heidegger relies on other concepts associated with the originary past of Dasein's temporality: thrownness, facticity, repeating (*Wiederholen*) and handing down (*überliefern*).⁸

Heidegger is clear that the entire analysis of historicity in chapter 5 is rooted in his account of Dasein's temporality in chapter 3 (especially section 65) and chapter 4. All the basic notions of historicity are defined in terms of temporality. He writes, "it turns out that the interpretation of the historicity of Dasein is basically just a more concrete elaboration of temporality" (SZ, p. 382). So historicity is not another existential feature besides temporality, but a way to spell it out in more concrete detail. The concreteness Heidegger wants to add lies in the specific possibilities that, in each case, Dasein exists as. While the existential analytic cannot say anything specific about actual possibilities of actual people, it can, he writes, "ask *in general*, from where the possibilities are drawn, onto which Dasein in fact projects itself" (SZ, p. 383). The basic question Heidegger is seeking to answer with his analysis of historicity, then, is simply this: Why are *these* possibilities *my* possibilities? What explains, or what makes it possible, that a specific, concrete existence projects itself onto, or understands itself in terms of, specific possibilities?⁹

The basic answer has to do with taking over possibilities in coming back to your thrownness. Heidegger writes:

Resoluteness, in which you come back to yourself, in each case discloses factual possibilities of authentic existing from the culture which, as thrown, you take on (*übernimmt*). Such resolute coming back to thrownness harbors within it a handing down to yourself (*Sichüberliefern*) of received (*überkommener*) possibilities (SZ, p. 383).

Most of this – namely the part about "coming back to yourself" – repeats a central claim of Heidegger's analysis of temporality. The unity of the originary future, past and present makes up the being of care, and hence the structure of the self. The originary future is "maintaining a possibility as a possibility and in so doing letting yourself come towards yourself" (SZ, p. 325). You can only come towards yourself by way of coming back: "Only insofar as you are as 'I have-been' can you futurally come towards yourself in such a way that you come back" (SZ, p. 326). So it is part of the structure of temporality that in existing you come towards yourself by coming back to your beenness, to what you "have-been".

To illustrate this with an example: Say you are a philosophy professor listening to a paper at a conference. "Letting yourself come towards yourself" here means, first, to project yourself onto this possibility, or (another way to say the same thing) to understand yourself in terms of this possibility, or (yet another way to say the same thing) to *know how to be* a professor at a conference. So your competences are deployed for the sake of being a professor. You know how to listen, strain, close your eyes, tilt your head etc. You know what to focus on and what to ignore, honing in on the drone of the speaker's voice, while blocking out the murmur of the wind outside. You also know how to carry yourself, when to chuckle,

⁸ One way to think of birth is to spell out the analogy with death. Death is the possibility that closes down all other possibilities. So birth, we might say, is a feature of Dasein that opens up all possibilities.

⁹ Here lurks another reading of birth: Death, as Dasein's *ownmost* possibility, constitutes Dasein's mineness. So birth, we might say, accounts for the "thisness."

when to frown, and so on. Second, you come towards yourself by “coming back to what you have-been”. This means that in deploying all this know-how you also find yourself disposed in determinate ways. So the murmur of the wind or creaking of floorboards affects you as unimportant background noise, the echoing room as too large, the speaker’s voice too low. Your disposedness and know-how work together, as it were. You listen for the sake of “coming towards yourself” as a professor. At the same time, your listening already discloses the situation in a “professorish” way, and so you are coming towards yourself as you already find yourself. The Dasein that you are *coming towards* is the one that you *already are*. This is what Heidegger means by saying that you can only come towards yourself “in such a way that you come back.”

What is new, in this passage from the historicity chapter, is the claim about “delivering” or “handing possibilities down to yourself.” Roughly this means that you find yourself thrown into a world and the possibilities in terms of which you understand yourself, or for the sake of which you exist, somehow emerge from that world.

Proximally and for the most part the self is lost in the anyone, and it understands itself in terms of the existence-possibilities that are around in today’s average public construal of Dasein (SZ, p. 383).

Authentic existentiell understanding does not withdraw from this received construal; rather it resolutely seizes the chosen possibility in terms of this construal, and against it, and yet again for it (SZ, p. 383).

Being a philosophy professor and participating in philosophy conferences are possibilities in this world, so you can be a philosophy professor as one does, or you can seize this possibility resolutely. No matter what, the question remains how *these* possibilities are *your* possibilities, and here it is not enough to say that being a philosophy professor is something one can do today (while being a court jester no longer is).

Heidegger’s point here is that delivering the chosen inherited possibility or delivering yourself is the same thing. You are what you are able to be. Consider our example. In “coming back to your thrownness” you hand down or “deliver to yourself” received possibilities. The possibility, in this example, is existing as a philosophy professor. This possibility is an ability-to-be, a *Seinkönnen*, consisting of the appropriate know-how and being attuned to the right kinds of solicitations. You come back to yourself insofar as your know-how discloses the situation in unison with how you find yourself disposed to it. Thus disclosing the situation, you are already in it. In other words, you do not skillfully and attunedly disclose a situation in which one can then (choose to) exist as a philosophy professor or not; rather you disclose the situation by being one.

This possibility is received or traditional (*überkommen*) because of your thrownness. In §29 on Da-sein as disposedness Heidegger writes:

Dasein is, explicitly or not, disposed in its thrownness. In disposedness Dasein is always already brought before itself, it has always already found itself, not as a perceptual coming across itself, but as an attuned being-itself-disposed (*gestimmtes Sichbefinden*, SZ, p. 135).

You are always disposed, and you are always disposed in your thrownness, which is what Heidegger says you come back to. This means that the specific way you find yourself solicited by aspects of your situation is prefigured by the facticity of your *Überantwortung*. Your thrownness dictates that you can find yourself in the conference as a professor; perhaps you could find yourself here as a stenographer. But not as a scribe or amanuensis. If you make a conscious effort to develop the skills of a scribe, i.e. carefully copying manuscripts by hand, it will come out as something else, a calligrapher or research assistant perhaps. There are professorish skills and attunements in the “there,” but there are no longer scribe-ish ones. As quoted above, you disclose the situation and can only disclose the situation by taking on (*übernehmen*) these skills and attunements.

Resoluteness, in which you come back to yourself, in each case discloses the factual possibilities of authentic existing from the culture (*Erbe*) which, as thrown, you take on (SZ, p. 383).

Delivering yourself or delivering possibilities then consists in taking on a culture or a heritage in taking up available skills and attunements, resolutely or not.

So Heidegger’s answer to the basic question of the historicity chapter – why are *these* possibilities *my* possibilities? – consists of a bi-directional claim. On the one hand these possibilities are mine because I take them on. Authentically or not, I exercise the know-how of an ability-to-be, and I find myself responsive to the solicitations appropriate to this ability. On the other hand, I take on these skills and attunements because only in doing so can I be a self at all. The only way for the temporal structure of care to engage, i.e. the only way for Dasein to exist, as a self determined by mineness, is to take on received possibilities.

Heidegger defines extendedness in terms of this sketch of an authentic way of taking on a possibility grounded in the received culture. Extendedness is the unity of the temporal ecstases in historical existing as a possibility. Your existence is extended, temporally extended, insofar as your future and your beenness are unified, i.e. insofar as in existing for the sake of a possibility (i.e. the futural ecstasis of coming-towards with its horizontal schema of for-the-sake-of) you come back to your thrownness (i.e. the past ecstasis of having-been with its horizontal schema of in-the-face-of). This is how you “hold birth and death and their ‘inbetween’ ‘encompassed’ [*einbezogen*] in your existence” (SZ, p. 390).

Heidegger emphasizes two aspects of extendedness. First, it is a feature of constancy. Constancy is the sameness or self-identity of Dasein. Heidegger first addresses it in §64 on “Care and Selfhood,” in preparation for the analysis of originary temporality. Here, now, he answers the question raised there. In particular he writes that

Constancy does not first form itself by cobbling together time-slices; rather these arise from already extended temporality (SZ, p. 391).

So constancy is not a constructed unity of the self, but an underlying one. Heidegger has a helpful discussion of his existential notion of self-sameness in his Kant lectures. There he writes:

The self must be able to identify itself *as existing*. It must be able to understand itself in every concrete instance as the self-same

futural-having-been, uniting the resolution [*Entschluß*] to a possibility and the commitment [*Verpflichtung*] to the past. This displacing-yourself-into-yourself [*Sich-in-sich-versetzen*], extending into all dimensions of temporality, makes up the real concept, the existential concept of self-identification (GA25, p. 395).

So Heidegger takes seriously the prominent inclination in the history of philosophy to define the self in terms of a self-identification. But he does not think this self-identification is cognitive like Kant's "I think," or reflective like Husserl's transcendental ego. Instead, he says here, it is existential, and that means it is a disposed ability. More precisely, it is the way in which ability-to-be and finding-yourself-disposed, *Seinkönnen* and *Sichbefinden* are unified, and in so being unified constitute the mineness of existence. Extendedness is a feature of this, i.e. constancy is always extended constancy, because extendedness is just Heidegger's name for the ecstatic unity of originary future and past; this is how ability and disposedness, resolve and commitment are united.

Second, Heidegger emphasizes that extendedness constitutes an *immediate* openness to the past.

In fateful repeating of possibilities that have been, Dasein brings itself back "immediately," i.e. temporally-ecstatically, to that which has been before it (SZ, p. 390f).

It is immediate insofar as you do not first require a representation, or a re-experience, or a memory in order to exist in terms of the past. Your beenness, i.e. the way you find yourself disposed on the basis of taking on a possibility as your own, is an immediate, constitutive part of being you.

We now have a sketch of Heidegger's existential ontology of the self as a temporally extended, constant, skillful and disposed ability that takes on or takes over possibilities from its culture. The main question of this paper still remains open. How does this ontology account for the supposedly derivative phenomena of the unity of the self over time in the ordinary sense? What does Heidegger's insistence on the unity of the temporal ecstases contribute to worries about the connectedness of occurrent time-slices? Heidegger himself raises this very question. After explaining authentic historicity he asks how all this stuff about fate is supposed to constitute the connectedness of life (SZ, p. 387). It might seem as if he avoids answering the question in his section on inauthentic historicity; here he merely argues that questions about the unity of the self over time are badly formulated and arise from the "irresoluteness that makes up the in-constancy of a self" which is dispersed in disconnected experiences and worldly events (SZ, p. 390). Heidegger actually makes an important point about the diachronic connectedness views in general, and memory-based accounts in particular. In order to understand his point, we first need to take a closer look at the role of episodic memory in contemporary accounts of the self.

3. Episodic Memory and Re-experience

It has become fairly standard among people who concern themselves with memory (philosophers, psychologist, cognitive scientists, cognitive neurologists) to accept a distinction between four different types of memory:¹⁰

- *Short-term, or working memory*: You can remember a phone number long enough to dial it, and the beginning of a sentence or paragraph long enough to read the rest without losing the meaning.
- *Procedural memory*: This is long-term, implicit memory that enables you to learn and perform skills and habits, such as remembering how to play the piano, ride a bicycle. Some philosophers call this “habit memory”.
- *Semantic memory*: Long-term and explicit. You remember facts, such as that Paris is the capital of France. Some philosophers call this “propositional memory” or “factual memory.”
- *Episodic memory*: Long-term and explicit. You remember specific events with their spatial or temporal context. You may remember the first time you saw the ocean, or that there was a mosquito in your room last night. This is the kind of memory that plays a prominent role in discussions of personal identity and the continuity of the self. Many people think episodic memory is co-extensive with autobiographical memory. Some philosophers have called it “recollection memory” or “personal memory.”

There are several grounds for this distinction into four types. Primarily it is based on phenomenological or introspective differences. They are bolstered by brain imaging technology, which maps different functions of memory onto different parts of the brain. Similarly, studies of various pathologies of memory resulting from injury or surgery have reinforced these distinctions along with a rough map of brain functions. One famous case was Henry Molaison (HM), who mostly lost the ability to form new episodic and semantic memories after his medial temporal lobes were removed to treat his epilepsy, but whose procedural and working memories were mostly intact. Another is KC, who suffered extensive head injuries in a motorcycle accident and seems to have lost all episodic memories, but retains semantic ones.¹¹

¹⁰ See Tulving, E., “Episodic and Semantic Memory,” in E. Tulving & W. Donaldson eds. *Organization of Memory*. Academic Press, New York, 1972: pp. 382-402. There are objectors. Famously Wittgenstein resisted the suggestion that memory is a single overarching category. See his *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*.

¹¹ Two points are noteworthy. First, people are bad at introspecting. It is hard to grasp and articulate one’s memories and to sort them into different types. Notably, it took almost one year before friends and family of KC noticed that he no longer has episodic memories. This is surprising in the case of semantic and episodic memory, since these two types are defined as essentially involving “conscious recall,” and hence one would expect people to notice when they have them. Consequently there is little agreement about the value of the phenomenology of memory. A lot of cognitive psychologist and neuroscientists prefer to ignore subjective reports altogether. A second point is that almost all descriptions and theoretical models of memory are shaped by a dominating metaphor of information that is “encoded,” “stored,” and “recalled”. This metaphor might seem apt for semantic memory, but less so for procedural memory

Episodic memory figures prominently in philosophical discussions of the continuity of the self, due to what Endel Tulving called “autonoetic” consciousness (1972). On standard accounts, mostly following Tulving, episodic memory is composed of two parts. If I remember *episodically* that there was a mosquito in my room last night, this experience includes first of all the information – that there was a mosquito – and secondly an immediate presentation of the way in which I originally gained access to that information – through hearing that high-pitched buzzing. It is as if in remembering I hear that buzzing again. Episodic remembering is therefore sometimes described as a “mental time travel” (this is Tulving’s original phrase) or as “re-experiencing.” The memory reproduces or re-presents the original event and in so doing *by itself* provides the cause or justification for taking the information to be true. I believe that there was a mosquito in my room *because* I remember it in just this way, i.e. I remember that I heard it *by hearing it again* in some sense, or by re-experiencing the buzzing in my act of remembering. Through this autonoetic aspect of consciousness, the act of remembering refers directly or immediately to the original experience that presumably caused the memory.

Spelling out the phenomenology of re-experiencing requires some care. To begin with, the memory is never exactly like the original experience, but more attenuated. If my current memory of the buzzing of the mosquito were exactly like the real event last night, then I suppose it would count as a vivid and worrisome hallucination, rather than an ordinary memory. I hear the buzzing again without really hearing it. The act of remembering is mixed in, or takes place alongside an ongoing awareness of the current circumstances, so the “time travel” is partial, or hypothetical. There is no confusion about the time, place or context in which I am having the memory. I am not hallucinating this mosquito now, but remembering *now* that *then* I heard the buzzing. Nevertheless, the place (my bed) and time (last night) are part of the autonoetic component of the experience of the memory, not merely part of the information. I experience it now as having experienced it then. To take another example, I remember that it is cold on Ocean Beach in San Francisco in July, and I remember it by remembering feeling the cold (which is how I first gained access to that information). This memory is different from, say, remembering that it is cold on Ocean Beach and remembering that I felt the cold because I wrote a note to myself that I felt the cold. That would make the memory semantic or propositional; I would remember that I felt cold on the beach, just I as remember that Kofi Anan was secretary general of the UN. In episodic memory, by contrast, I remember by somehow re-experiencing feeling the cold, without however actually feeling cold now.

Re-experiencing is what Husserl calls a *Vergegenwärtigen*, in contrast to perception or hallucination, which are modes of *Gegenwärtigen*. In fact, episodic memory is quite similar to imagination, another mode of *Vergegenwärtigen*. I can easily imagine having heard a mosquito last night in my room, and I can get the same attenuated experience “as if” I was hearing the mosquito.¹² The difference is that the imagining does not refer to an original experience. Imagining events as past, unlike episodic remembering, does not bring its own particular context with it and it does not place me, the imaginer, in this experience.

This difference between imagination and remembering is instructive in isolating what is peculiar and important about the autonoetic component of episodic memory. I re-experience feeling the cold on Ocean Beach and I re-experience hearing the buzzing of the mosquito *not* because of the vividness of the quasi-perceptual presentation of the cold or the

¹² For a good example of a real, though attenuated experience in imagination, imagine biting into a lemon.

buzzing. It is not so vivid at all, and in most cases no more vivid than if I imagine these events. I also do not re-experience these events simply because they are given to me as experienced from the first-person point of view. In imagining, I also imagine that *I* felt the cold or heard the mosquito. Instead what distinguishes episodic remembering is that I experience, with attenuated vividness, from the first-person point of view, this event as given in a specific context of circumstances, time and place that is immediately related to my current self-understanding: last night, last year, when I was young.¹³ Retrospective imagination cannot produce that context. I can easily imagine having heard a mosquito, but I find it difficult, if not impossible, to imagine having heard a mosquito *last night* as long as I remember that I did not actually hear one. Things are more vague if I do not remember what did or did not take place. There are certainly cases in which I am not sure whether I remember or imagine a past event. Do you actually remember the first time you saw the ocean? Or the first night in the house you now live in?¹⁴

Aside from various questions about the phenomenology of such remembering, the auto-noetic feature of episodic memory constitutes a significant explanatory difficulty for the ontology of the self. It raises the question how the self must be constituted so that it can recognize certain experiences as reproducing its own prior experiences. In other words, what is the ontological structure of such a shared, persistent, or synthetic mineness?

To get a grasp on this mineness, cognitive scientists of a phenomenological bent have focused on the pathological experience of “thought intrusion” or “insertion” reported by schizophrenic patients, in which precisely this ability to immediately recognize experiences as originating from oneself is lacking. In such cases, a patient reports that she “has” a thought, but that this thought does not come from her and is not her own. It was inserted, or it intruded from outside. Somebody *else* is thinking the thought, and using her mind to do so.¹⁵ It appears that what is *missing* in such pathological experiences—the self-attribution, ownership, or mineness of a thought—is precisely what distinguishes the auto-noetic component of episodic memory. To clarify this, imagine a patient who has an experience that presents itself to her as a memory, say of having felt the cold on the beach, but she does not recognize it as her own memory. For her, this experience is not a re-experience, but instead the experience, for the first time, of somebody else’s re-experience. It might in fact be her memory; so she did herself experience the original event as hers, and she is now herself experiencing the memory. But the mere fact that both the original episode and the memory of it are experienced by the same consciousness is not sufficient for constituting a persistent or

¹³ The relation to the current self-understanding is crucial and complicated, and I cannot spell it out here. One important aspect is that memories, unlike imaginings, place me under obligations and expectations with respect to the remembered content. If I remember the cold on the beach, I should pack warmer clothes next time; if I imagine it, I am under no such obligation.

¹⁴ Note that prospective imagination has no difficulty in producing a suitably specific context. I can easily imagine sitting on the airplane next week. It is, indeed, difficult to distinguish prospective imagination from prospective memory. I have to remember, for example, to catch my flight next Monday, or buy flowers for my wife on Wednesday. How is such remembering distinct from imagining going to the airport or the florist next week? Due to its auto-noetic feel, episodic memory appears deeply linked to future planning. KC, apparently, cannot do either.

¹⁵ Some patients report that a specific person, known to them, is the proper owner of the inserted thoughts. Others merely report the alien feel of the thoughts, without attributing it to a specific person.

synthetic self. Further, it might be possible to demonstrate to her that this is in fact her own memory; she might be able to reconstruct it herself and, as it were, appropriate that memory through a third-personal investigation. She could, for example, consult her diary or see a video of herself on that beach. But this, too, is not sufficient for a synthetic mineness, for she would know about her own re-experiencing in exactly the way somebody else might know about it, from a third-person point of view. So neither the fact that the same consciousness experiences the original event and the memory, nor a present belief that I experienced the original event, are sufficient for constituting the mineness of episodic memory.¹⁶

Zahavi gives a Husserlian account of this mineness based on what he calls “the self as an experiential dimension.” Every conscious state has a certain first-personal givenness, and although the quality or mode of that givenness varies according to the state – i.e. perceiving is given with a kind of fullness that distinguishes it from imagining and recollecting – they share as a “common feature the quality of *mineness*, that is, the fact that the experiences are characterized by first-personal givenness that immediately reveals them as one’s own” (2005, p. 124). In Zahavi’s analysis, this mineness, or “ipseity,” constitutes a minimal, pre-reflective “core” sense of self on which the more complex narrative or autobiographical notion of a “person” depends.¹⁷ Moreover, this mineness of the givenness of conscious experiences is a “field” or “dimension”. Overlapping experiences, such as when I perceive my desk while imagining the ocean and remembering a melody, are given in a single “pervasive dimension of first-personal experiencing.” Further, this dimension is temporally extended insofar as each of these experiences is constituted in the unity of retention, intention, and protention. In episodic memory, the past experience is “automatically given as *my* past experience,” i.e. in the same experiential dimension as my memory of it. This “shared mineness” or “shared manner of givenness,” rather than some kind of psychological continuity or act-transcendent synthesis, explains the identity of the self through time (2005, p. 132).

It seems, however, that Zahavi merely shifts the bump in the rug. Like Locke, Zahavi suggests an answer to the psychological question about how I experience an episodic memory as mine, but this account does not answer the ontological question how my selfhood must be constituted in order to make that kind of psychology possible. There are two immediate problems. First, what the schizophrenic lacks is not the ipseity of the givenness, but some higher-level integration of the ipseity, like agency. In fact Gallagher and Zahavi, while maintaining that schizophrenia is a condition of “diminished ipseity” (2008, p. 209; it is hard to understand how the “minimal” ipseity could be “diminished”), argue that “even if the inserted thoughts or alien movements are felt as intrusive and strange, they cannot lack the quality of mineness completely, since the afflicted subject is quite aware that it is he himself rather than somebody else who is experiencing these alien thoughts or movements.” Therefore, “rather than involving a complete lack of a sense of ownership, passivity phenomena like thought insertions primarily involve a lack of a sense of self-agency” (2008,

¹⁶ The question here is not whether the schizophrenic in this example is the same self across time. On Locke’s account, I take it, she is not, simply because, for Locke, the psychological continuity that shows itself in episodic remembering *constitutes* the self. The question, rather, is what such psychological continuity consists of in the first place, or, to use Locke’s own vocabulary, what is the first-personal consciousness so that *it* can be “extended backwards.”

¹⁷ Zahavi and Gallagher/Zahavi identify this with Damasio’s “core self,” the givenness of the core consciousness, the “single level of organization that remains stable across the lifetime of the organism.” Zahavi 2005, p. 138f; Gallagher/Zahavi 2008, p. 202f.

p. 210). So, in such cases the mineness, diminished though it may be, does not explain the identity of the self through time, and we are back to the question we started with: What makes up this sense of self-agency? Or, what is undiminished mineness, beyond the immediacy of first-personal givenness?

From a Heideggerian point of view a second problem is that like Kant's "I think," Zahavi's mineness or "ipseity" figures ontologically like a kind of accompaniment, that "occurs together with" the experience. In *Being and Time* Heidegger criticizes Kant's analysis of the transcendental apperception because it "does not see that the ontological 'precondition' for the 'I think something' is the basic determination of the self" (SZ, p. 321). The object of the "I think" is always an entity in the world; world, however, is a constitutive part of being-in-the-world, which is what "I" really means. "Saying 'I' always refers to the entity that in each case I am, as 'I-am-in-a-world'" (SZ, p. 321). Similarly, Zahavi needs to explain what these experiences are, that are given as mine; such an explanation, presumably, would reveal the phenomenon of the world, which according to Heidegger is part of the structure of the "ipseity" of experience.¹⁸

4. Conclusion: Five Heideggerian Theses about Memory

Heidegger's ontology of the self in terms of an extended, historically situated, ecstatically temporal unity suggest a different account of how episodic memory and similar auto-noetic comportments, such as planning for the future, are possible. This ontology should enable us to make sense of these phenomena along the following lines: I can re-recognize my memory as my own because the self, whose mineness is involved both in the original experience and the re-experience, is already extended over both of these experiences.

Heidegger's view has two aspects, a phenomenology and a claim about "transcendental psychology". The transcendental part is the claim from the historicity chapter that the persistence of the self over time, insofar as it makes sense at all, has as the condition of its possibility the extended constancy of the self. The phenomenology is included in chapter six, especially §79 and §80, in which Heidegger explains his notion of world-time. I want to start with a brief look at the phenomenology.

In dealing with entities people articulate time either expressly (*aussprechen*) or through inexplicit interpretation (*auslegen*). Such articulation is "datable," i.e. it always lays out or points out a moment in terms of a determinate way in which Dasein is amidst entities: "now, that..." or "back then, when...". This articulation of time is a pervasive feature of our everyday concerned dealings. We say "it's cold," or put on a sweater or hunch, or shrug without saying anything, and in doing so we also mean "now, that it's cold" (SZ, p. 407). Besides being datable in terms of our being amidst entities, the time that we articulate is also spanned, and shareable or public. It is spanned insofar as the articulated time, the "now,

¹⁸ Gallagher and Zahavi apparently want to make this point about world-immersion and think they are channeling Heidegger when they write that "mineness" is a "primitive form of self-referentiality" which is "always the self-experience of a world-immersed embodied agent" (2008, p. 204). However they then claim that mineness is "fully compatible" with the "being-in-the-world of consciousness." Of course on Heidegger's view it is not consciousness that is "in-the-world." On the contrary, conscious awareness usually presumes an interruption or decontextualization of the smooth flow of attuned competences that make up being-in.

that..." means something with a duration: "now, during the break, at dinner, this evening, this summer" etc (SZ, p. 409). Such duration, however, does not show up as continuous and uninterrupted. "In going along through the everyday, Dasein never understands itself as unfolding along a continuous series of pure 'nows.' The time that Dasein takes for itself has holes, as it were" (SZ, p. 409). Finally, this datable, shared, spanned time is intelligible in terms of the "in-order-to" relations that ground in the "for-the-sake-of" and makes up the meaningfulness (*Bedeutsamkeit*) of the world. This is why Heidegger calls it "world-time" (SZ, p. 414).

Episodic memory is an instance of such articulation of world-time. I articulate: "then, when that mosquito was in my room..." or "back then, when that cold fog rolled onto Ocean beach...". If this is right, this has a few consequences for how we should think about episodic memory from a Heideggerian perspective. I will sum these up as five Heideggerian theses about auto-noesis and episodic memory:

(1) For one thing, there is nothing essential about the explicit consciousness of the memory. The conscious auto-noetic experience described in explicit episodic memory lies at the far end of a continuum of articulations, from engaged concerned manipulation that lays out or sets apart available entities and in so doing articulates them; to expressions of spoken articulation in the course of such engagement; to, finally, explicit articulations that reflect on themselves by interrupting ongoing engagements.

Consequently, the "mineness" that makes re-experiencing possible is not limited to conscious experiences. Rather, conscious episodic remembering has this kind of "mineness" in the same way as the entire range of phenomena that articulate world-time; and this is just the entire range of phenomena that make up Dasein's being-in-the-world. To be in the world, to be familiar with it, is, in each case, to disclose it as mine. Articulation—this particular ability inherent in Dasein's understanding ("The projection of understanding has its own possibility of forming itself (*sich auszubilden*). This *Ausbildung* of understanding we call *Auslegung*" SZ, p. 148)—is, among other things, an ability to carry this mineness forward into explicitness. Zahavi, like Locke, looks for the constitution of this mineness in the particular consciousness of the conscious experience. This turns out to be impossible, on Heidegger's picture. That consciousness must itself be understood as arising out of the existential engagement in the world; and this engagement in the world contains the mineness that is reflected in the explicit memory.

(2) Thinking of memories in terms of the articulation of world-time suggests an explanation of the phenomenal "richness" of episodic memories. We can compare this to the "richness" of the visual field that presents itself as full, even though only the center of it is perceived in detail. In the case of the visual field we can understand the apparent richness or fullness in terms of the possibilities and solicitations that pervade the visual field. I see the margins "as if" they were full and detailed because I see them as possible centers of a possible direction of view. They solicit me to turn that way, and this solicitation itself fills my experience. We can think of episodic memories in similar ways. Thinking back to the cold on the beach last year gives me a rich experience, because this particular "back then, when..." is full of solicitation for further articulations. Datable world-time is meaningful (*bedeutsam*) because it is shot through with the in-order-to relations that structure the *Bedeutsamkeit* of the world.

(3) This raises a further point. I know my way around the world through my competent familiarity with it. If the structure of memories is the structure of the worldhood of the world, then my ability to navigate memories consists of the same competences that disclose a world for me in the first place. I disclose the *memory* of the cold on Ocean Beach just as I disclose the cold beach.

Abilities do not *accompany* experiences, and they are not momentary. From the point of view of the occurrent time-series, the ability, unlike the conscious experience, is neither located at the original experience, nor at the moment of episodic recall. In an important sense, the same ability spans both moments. And insofar as these distinct moments show up as experiences, these world-disclosing abilities not only span (i.e. occur at) both moments, but constitute them as such.

(4) To explain the phenomenology of auto-noetic re-experiencing, this Heideggerian framework depends less on encoding, storing and retrieving information. The mineness of the memory is not inherent in a momentary act in the stream of consciousness. Instead it is the mineness of world-disclosure. Heidegger claims that in such articulation of world-time, Dasein articulates *itself*. “The articulating pointing out of... also makes *itself* explicit, i.e. the circumspect, competent being amidst available entities” (SZ, p. 407f). So on Heidegger’s account episodic memory is an articulation of Dasein’s self-understanding, and this is why I experience my memories as my own.

(5) This leads to Heidegger’s transcendental claim. The mineness of the articulated memory derives from the mineness of originary disclosure. Heidegger explains the structure of this disclosure in his analysis of originary temporality. Dasein’s temporality is extended. This existential extendedness is not itself chronologically extended. However, it is the condition for the intelligibility of chronological extension. In other words, we can make sense of ourselves as existing across different moments in clock-time because we exist as existentially extended entities.

Accordingly, Heidegger claims that the phenomenology of world-time shows how this “condition of intelligibility” relation plays out. The articulation of the “then” and “now,” in the horizon of a “now,” “earlier,” and “later” is only possible as “temporality articulating itself” (*sich auslegende Zeitlichkeit*, SZ, p. 408). Heidegger writes:

Temporality constitutes ecstatically-horizontally the openness of the Da, and therefore it is in an originary way always already articulable, and hence familiar, in the Da (SZ, p. 408).

The datability of the ‘now,’ ‘then,’ and ‘thence’ is the reflection of the ecstatic constitution of temporality and therefore also essential for time as it is made explicit (SZ, p. 408).

This is a double claim: Dasein articulates itself as world-time. (“World-time is one of the things that first makes possible care as the being of the factually existing self” SZ, p. 419). And world time is the articulation of temporality. These two, of course, fit together. That is the basic point of the temporality/historicity analysis of the self: temporality is nothing other than the ontology of the self that experiences itself as unified across world time. Episodic memory is part of the articulation of the self that makes world-time intelligible.